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1 Introduction 
In a speech delivered at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2017, the 
U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May called on social media companies to do more to 
remove and block terrorist content from their platforms [1]. In the speech she stated 
that the average lifespan of online propaganda from the so-called Islamic State (IS) was 
36 hours. For such content to be disrupted effectively, she claimed that this figure 
needed to be reduced to one to two hours. This has since come to be known as the 
‘golden window’: if terrorist material can be detected and removed within one to two 
hours, its spread will be prevented.1 
Recent research by Conway et al. found that IS and its supporters are already being 
significantly disrupted by Twitter suspension activity, and now struggle to ‘develop and 
maintain robust and influential communities on Twitter. As a result, pro-IS Twitter 
activity has largely been reduced to tactical use of throwaway accounts for distributing 
links to pro-IS content on other platforms’ [2]. This is consistent with the findings of our 
own pilot study, which we presented to this conference last year [3]. In our pilot study 
we examined the release of issue 15 of IS’s online magazine Dabiq on Twitter. The 
accounts within our dataset that had been suspended were largely very young accounts 
with relatively low numbers of followers and were suspended before they gained much 
of a following. In other words, they seemed to be throwaway accounts, whose purpose 
was to disseminate that particular issue of Dabiq magazine. We concluded our pilot 
study by pointing instead to a different challenge. The number of throwaway accounts 
that were created to disseminate issue 15 of Dabiq was relatively small. Far greater was 
the number of other accounts, not sympathetic to IS, that posted links to the new issue 
or to discussion of it. Moreover, these accounts were not being suspended. It was these 
accounts, we felt, that were maintaining the presence and discoverability of Dabiq issue 
15 on Twitter. We thus concluded that ‘the IS sympathisers who disseminated issue 15 
of Dabiq caused a fairly small splash; it was others that caused the ripples to travel a 
long way’ [3]. 
The objective of this paper is to test whether the findings of our pilot study hold true for 
a larger dataset – or whether the dynamic by which issue 15 of Dabiq was shared on 
Twitter was attributable more to other factors, such as the theme of that particular 
issue. In this study we, therefore, examine the release on Twitter of a total of nine issues 
                                                        
1 Notice that this is subtly different to the guidelines produced by the European Commission. The 
Commission’s guidelines call on social media companies to remove terrorist content within an hour of it 
being referred (‘A Europe that protects: Commission reinforces EU response to illegal content online’ 
European Commission Press Release, 1 March 2018). Prime Minister May’s statement refers to one to two 
hours after the content is posted. 
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of IS’s online magazine Rumiyah, the successor to the now-abandoned Dabiq. In pursuit 
of this objective, we have two sets of research questions. First, our pilot study suggested 
that pro-IS throwaway accounts were only creating a small splash on Twitter. Has this 
been the case for Rumiyah? Are these pro-IS accounts being disrupted effectively, before 
they manage to exert much influence? Second, what is the relative influence of the pro-
IS throwaway accounts in comparison to other accounts that are not sympathetic to IS, 
but nonetheless disseminate its propaganda – whether that be for research purposes, 
personal interest or even to provide an oppositional voice or engage in debate? In other 
words, how great is the ripple effect generated by these non-IS sympathiser accounts?
2 Methodology 
In this section we outline how we collected data, provide an overview of our dataset and 
explain the focus of this study, and then finally describe how we approached the task of 
data analysis.  
2.1 Data collection 
Data was collected using Cardiff University’s ‘Sentinel’ research tool [4]. The data 
collection period was 1 November 2016 to 31 October 2017. During this period, all 
Twitter posts were collected that: (1) mentioned the term ‘Rumiyah’; (2) were posted 
within 21 days of the release of a new issue; and, (3) were posted from an account that 
used the English language interface (U.S. or U.K.). The last of these reflected our decision 
to focus specifically on users that posted about the English language version of Rumiyah 
(which is also published in multiple other languages). Given the study’s focus on the 
characteristics of those who post about Rumiyah, we also collected the public openly 
available user data of these posters, the details of the first post by each user following 
the release of a new issue, the onward distribution counts of those posts, and the 
account status (at the end of the data collection period).2 
As Table 1 shows, during the 12-month data collection period a total of 11 issues of 
Rumiyah were published (issues 3 to 13). As a result of collection drop outs, the data 
collection for issues six and eight was incomplete and so these issues have been 
excluded from the study. Our dataset thus encompasses a total of nine issues. 
                                                        
2 For the purposes of this study, Sentinel functioned only as a repository of structured data supplied by the 
Twitter Streaming API. 
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Table 1: Original linkers by account type  
Issue 
Date and time of first 
tweet collected 
Date and time of last 
tweet collected 
Notes 
3 11/11/2016 17:18 02/12/2016 17:18  
4 07/12/2016 19:33 28/12/2016 19:33  
5 06/01/2017 16:57 27/01/2017 16:57  
6 04/02/2017 18:53 25/02/2017 18:53 
Incomplete collection so not included in 
the dataset 
7 07/03/2017 16:04 28/03/2017 16:04  
8 05/04/2017 15:23 26/04/2017 15:23 
Incomplete collection so not included in 
the dataset 
9 04/05/2017 14:40 25/05/2017 14:40  
10 08/06/2017 21:32 29/06/2017 21:32 
Timing moderately uncertain due to 
similarly timed presence of a “fake issue” 
11 13/07/2017 15:00 03/08/2017 15:00 
Timing highly uncertain due to hashtag 
flooding and a “fake issue” 
12 06/08/2017 14:47 27/08/2017 14:47  
13 09/09/2017 18:58 30/09/2017 18:58  
 
2.2 Overview of dataset 
There was a total of 9 968 distinct users that posted about one (or more) of the nine 
issues of Rumiyah that we examined. This is an average of 1 108 users per issue, which 
is noteworthy given that in our previous study a total of 11 586 distinct users posted 
about a single issue of Dabiq [3].  
Table 2 breaks the 9 968 users down according to: (1) whether the user account was 
extant, suspended or self-deleted by the end of our data collection period; and, (2) the 
number of issues that the user posted about. It shows, first, that over a quarter of the 
accounts (26.2%) were suspended and, unsurprisingly, that almost all of the accounts 
that were ultimately suspended only posted about one issue of Rumiyah (2 543 out of 
the 2 608 suspended accounts, i.e., 97.5%). (Though it should be acknowledged that 
accounts could have been suspended as a result of other Twitter activity and not 
because of the posts mentioning Rumiyah). More generally, Table 2 shows that the vast 
majority (90.3%) of users only posted about a single issue, and less than 2% posted 
about four issues or more.   
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Table 2: Number of issues each user posted about (within the 21-day window)  
Number of 
issues 
Extant accounts Suspended accounts Deleted accounts All users 
1 6209 (62.3%) 2543 (25.5%) 252 (2.5%) 9004 (90.3%) 
2 538 (5.4%) 45 (0.5%) 21 (0.2%) 604 (6.1%) 
3 154 (1.5%) 14 (0.1%) 2 (0.0%) 170 (1.7%) 
4 76 (0.8%) 3 (0.0%) 1 (0.0%) 80 (0.8%) 
5 44 (0.4%) 2 (0.0%) 0 46 (0.5%) 
6 24 (0.2%) 0 0 24 (0.2%) 
7 17 (0.2%) 0 0 17 (0.2%) 
8 13 (0.1%) 1 (0.0%) 1 (0.0%) 15 (0.2%) 
9 8 (0.1%) 0 0 8 (0.1%) 
Total 7083 (71.1%) 2608 (26.2%) 277 (2.8%) 9968 (100%) 
2.3 Focus of this study 
Given the nature of Twitter as a gateway platform [5], coupled with IS’s resort to the use 
of throwaway accounts, we chose to focus our analysis on out-linking posts, i.e., posts 
containing a link to an external site (be that to the magazine itself, extracts or excerpts 
from it, or news or commentary about the magazine). We also chose to focus on original 
posts, i.e., posts that were not a repost, link to or quote of any other post. In short, our 
analysis focuses on ‘original linkers’: users who independently sought to direct other 
users to content outside of the Twitter platform (including, but not limited to, copies of 
Rumiyah itself).  
Table 3 contains the same breakdown as Table 2, but is limited to just original linkers. 
As with the dataset as a whole, the vast majority (91.4%) of original linkers only posted 
about a single issue of Rumiyah. What is striking, however, is that a far higher 
proportion (71.4%) of original linkers had been suspended by the end of our data 
collection period. Only very rarely did an account that went on to be suspended post 
about more than one issue (11 out of 1006 suspended accounts, i.e., 1.1%). 
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Table 3: Number of issues each original linker posted about (within the 21-day window)  
Number of 
issues 
Extant accounts Suspended accounts Deleted accounts All users 
1 279 (19.8%) 995 (70.6%) 14 (1.0%) 1288 (91.4%) 
2 51 (3.6%) 6 (0.4%) 2 (0.1%) 59 (4.2%) 
3 12 (0.9%) 2 (0.1%) 0 14 (1.0%) 
4 20 (1.4%) 1 (0.1%) 0 21 (1.5%) 
5 7 (0.5%) 1 (0.1%) 0 8 (0.6%) 
6 6 (0.4%) 0 0 6 (0.4%) 
7 4 (0.3%) 0 0 4 (0.3%) 
8 5 (0.4%) 1 (0.1%) 1 (0.1%) 7 (0.5%) 
9 2 (0.1%) 0 0 2 (0.1%) 
Total 386 (27.4%) 1006 (71.4%) 17 (1.2%) 1409 (100%) 
 
Given the low number of original linkers that subsequently chose to close their account, 
in this paper we focus on those whose account was still in existence at the end of our 
data collection period (‘extant original linkers’, n=386) and those whose account was 
suspended by this date (‘suspended original linkers’, n=1006).  
2.4 Data analysis 
Using the data collected by Sentinel, we sought to identify and compare the features of 
‘extant original linkers’ and ‘suspended original linkers’. This quantitative analysis 
focused on: the size of each sub-group’s social network; the age of the accounts; the 
number of times each sub-group was retweeted; the number of repeat posts from each 
sub-group; and, the external sites to which each sub-group out-linked. We 
supplemented this by identifying the language in which each tweet the two sub-groups 
posted was written. The findings follow below.  
In addition to this quantitative analysis, we also conducted some qualitative analysis. 
The qualitative analysis focused on two features. First, the account type: whether it was 
the account of someone posting in a personal capacity, the account of someone posting 
in their capacity as an intelligence analyst or practitioner, the account of a news or 
media organisation, the account of an identified group, the account of someone posting 
in their capacity as an academic or researcher, the account of someone posting in their 
capacity as a journalist, or some other type of account (including where it was not 
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possible to classify it). Second, the combined tone of the account and post: whether it 
was sympathetic to the message of Rumiyah, overtly critical of it, or only sought to 
communicate factual material that was neither sympathetic nor critical. To classify 
users for each of these two features, we examined the account username, the account 
profile and the content of the post. Google Translate was used to translate non-English 
language account profiles and posts into English. In some cases, Google Translate was 
unable to detect the original language, meaning that translation was not possible and 
these accounts could not be included in this part of the analysis.  
3 Findings 
In this section we present the findings of our analysis. We begin with the quantitative 
findings before moving on to the qualitative ones. 
3.1 Follower/following network and account age 
First, we examine the follower/following count of the original linkers. Figure 1 shows 
the percentile distribution of the total number of users that the original linkers follow.  
Percentile distribution graphs indicate the proportion of the sample which have a 
certain value. So, if two curves rise to the same value (X) but at different percentiles (say 
10% and 20%), the one that rises to value X at the lower percentile has a greater 
proportion of users at that value or higher (in our example, the first curve shows that 
90% of users were at the value X or higher, compared to 80% for the second curve). 
Note also that: (1) in order to represent the data in its entirety, a logarithmic scale is 
used on the vertical axis in all figures; and, (2) where no value is present for a percentile 
it should be considered zero.  
In addition to the blue line (which shows the distribution for the extant original linkers) 
and the red line (which shows the distribution for the suspended original linkers), for 
the sake of comparison Figure 1 also shows the distribution for the dataset as a whole 
(green line). As Figure 1 shows, up until the 99th percentile the number of users that 
extant original linkers were following was greater than for the dataset as a whole. What 
is most striking, however, is the fact that over half (53.8%) of the suspended original 
linkers were following no other users at all. Only a small proportion of suspended 
original linkers (~5%) had a large following count (100+). 
  
  
 
 
 
    
    
  EUROPOL PUBLIC INFORMATION 8 / 18 
 
Figure 1: Percentile distribution of the number of users the original linkers follow 
Figure 2 shows the percentile distribution of the total number of followers that the 
original linkers had. 
Figure 2: Percentile distribution of the number of users that follow the original linkers 
Figure 2 follows a similar pattern to Figure 1. Up until the 99th percentile the extant 
original linkers had a greater number of followers than for the dataset as a whole. Most 
striking, however, is the fact that over half (55.5%) of the suspended original linkers 
had no followers at all, whilst an additional 11.3% had just one follower. And, as with 
the following count, only a small proportion of suspended original linkers (~5%) had a 
large follower count (100+).  
In addition to the follower/following network, we also examined the age of the user 
accounts. Figure 3 shows the percentile distribution. 
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Figure 3: Percentile distribution of account age (in days) of original linkers 
As with the follower/following count, Figure 3 shows a stark difference between extant 
original linkers and suspended original linkers. The extant original linkers were 
typically older accounts. By contrast, the vast majority (86.0%) of the suspended 
original linkers’ accounts were less than 28 days old, and roughly half (50.8%) were less 
than one day old. Of the accounts that were less than one day old, 60% were less than 
three hours old and 20% were less than one hour old. Our findings are thus consistent 
with Conway et al.’s statement that IS Twitter activity has largely been reduced to the 
tactical use of throwaway accounts. The fact that most suspended original linker 
accounts were very young and had only a small – or non-existent – social network 
suggests that they were set up specifically to advertise the release of the new issue, 
particularly when coupled with the additional fact that 14.5% of suspended original 
linkers had never posted before (and a further 32.4% had posted only four or fewer 
tweets previously).   
3.2 Retweets and repeat postings 
Our next set of findings examine the number of times the original linkers’ first post was 
retweeted and the number of tweets the original linkers posted that mentioned 
Rumiyah. Figure 4 shows the percentile distribution of the number of times the original 
linkers’ first post was retweeted. 
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Figure 4: Percentile distribution of the number of times the first post of an original linker 
was retweeted  
For both extant and suspended original linkers, the majority of first posts were not 
retweeted (76.4% and 89.6% respectively). As Figure 4 shows, when retweeting did 
occur the frequency was greater for extant original linkers. For this sub-group, the 99th 
percentile was 16 retweets and the highest (outlier) value was 220 retweets. By 
contrast, the 99th percentile for suspended original linkers was just four retweets, and 
the highest (outlier) value was ten. With few or no followers and lack of retweeting, the 
overall visibility of the suspended original linker accounts was low. These accounts thus 
seem to have relied upon being directly searched for, before they were suspended. 
Turning from retweets to repeat posting, Figure 5 examines the number of times 
original linkers posted tweets that mentioned a new issue of Rumiyah within 21 days of 
its release. 
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Figure 5: Percentile distribution of the number of times original linkers posted a tweet 
mentioning Rumiyah within 21 days of its release  
Beginning with the extant original linkers, only a small proportion posted Rumiyah 
mentioning tweets in high volumes within the 21 days following the release of a new 
issue. As Figure 5 shows, 5.2% of these users posted over 100 times, with the highest 
figure being 150 times. This may be contrasted with the figures for suspended original 
linkers. Roughly 70% of these users posted more than once, 40% posted more than five 
times, and 10% posted more than ten times prior to suspension. This repeat posting, we 
suggest, reflects an attempt to increase the likelihood of being seen, particularly given 
the lack of retweets. 
In terms of the findings for the dataset as a whole, it is worth noting that the highest 
number of posts mentioning Rumiyah by one account within the 21 day window was 
9 547. This appears to us to have been something like a chaff account. It began posting 
at around the time that issue ten of Rumiyah was released. Its tweets contained the 
hashtag “#Rumiyah”, followed by a random string of characters, then a link to another 
of its own posts. It continued posting until the day on which issue eleven of Rumiyah 
was released, when it was suspended. Whilst the intention behind the creation of the 
account cannot be stated with any certainty, the effect of the tweets it posted was to 
make it more difficult for someone using the hashtag “#Rumiyah” to search for a link to 
an e-copy of the magazine to find one. 
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3.3 Out-links 
Across the data for all suspended and extant original linkers, we identified a total of 164 
unique URL hostnames. Table 4 below shows the websites that were out-linked to most 
frequently by each group of original linker. (Note that the table only includes those 
websites that were out-linked to ten times or more). 
 
Table 4: External website hostnames out-linked to by original linkers >10 times 
Suspended original linkers Total Extant original linkers Total 
drive.google.com 235 fb.me 39 
archive.org 185 dlvr.it 35 
cldup.com 166 bit.ly 32 
pc.cd 96 ref.gl 30 
cloud.mail.ru 81 counterjihadreport.com 24 
yadi.sk 64 icct.nl 21 
justpaste.it 30 memri.org 16 
dropbox.com 27 ift.tt 16 
mediafire.com 26 heavy.com 15 
1drv.ms 24 clarionproject.org 15 
goo.gl 12 terrortrendsbulletin.com 14 
  express.co.uk 12 
 
As Table 4 shows, suspended original linkers generally out-linked to websites where 
content can be uploaded, viewed and downloaded. This would suggest that this group of 
original linkers was seeking to disseminate e-copies of Rumiyah itself, or associated 
content. As for extant original linkers, whilst we cannot say with any certainty what was 
shared via the out-links to dlvr.it, bit.ly, ref.gl or ift.tt, it is nonetheless clear that these 
original linkers out-linked to a more diverse set of websites that included other social 
media (Facebook), sites offering commentary and analysis (International Centre for 
Counter Terrorism, MEMRI, Clarion Project), blogs and activist movements (Counter 
Jihad Report, Terror Trends Bulletin) and news (Heavy, Daily Express).  
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3.4 Languages in which posts were written 
Table 5 shows the language in which the tweet posted by the original linker was 
written.3  
Table 5: Language in which post was written  
Language Extant original linkers Suspended original linkers Total 
English 410 (27.0%) 741 (48.8%) 1151 (75.9%) 
Arabic 5 (0.3%) 185 (12.2%) 190 (12.5%) 
Italian 36 (2.4%) 1 (0.1%) 37 (2.4%) 
German 7 (0.5%) 18 (1.2%) 25 (1.6%) 
French 16 (1.1%) 2 (0.1%) 18 (1.2%) 
Turkish 1 (0.1%) 14 (0.9%) 15 (1.0%) 
Croatian 0 (0.0%) 12 (0.8%) 12 (0.8%) 
Sindhi 0 (0.0%) 11 (0.7%) 11 (0.7%) 
Urdu 0 (0.0%) 10 (0.7%) 10 (0.7%) 
Other (<10) / 
Multiple 
24 (1.6%) 24 (1.6%) 48 (3.2%) 
Total 499 (32.9%) 1018 (67.1%) 1517 (100%) 
 
By far the most common language (for both extant and suspended original linkers) was 
English, with three-quarters (75.9%) of the tweets posted by these accounts written in 
the English language. This is unsurprising, given our decision to focus on posts from 
accounts that used the English language interface. What is noteworthy, however, is the 
number of tweets posted by suspended original linkers that were written in the Arabic 
language (185; 12.2% of all original linker posts). This is particularly striking given that 
the accounts that posted the tweets were all ones that used the English language 
                                                        
3 For the sake of completeness, two further points should be noted: (1) some user accounts may feature in 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 more than once. For example, if user X’s first Rumiyah mentioning post in the collection 
window for both issues 3 and 13 was an original content tweet containing an out-link, then each of these 
posts from user X will be included in the count in Tables 5, 6 and 7; and, (2) the totals for Tables 5, 6 and 7 
are different to the total for Table 3, because a different counting method was employed for Table 3. 
Unlike Tables 5, 6 and 7, Table 3 includes some posts that did not contain original content and/or did not 
contain an out-link. For example, if user Y’s first post mentioning Rumiyah in the collection window for 
issue 3 was an original out-linking post, then the count for Table 3 will include Y's first Rumiyah 
mentioning post in any of the other collection windows even if the post contained no original content 
and/or no out-link. 
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interface. Our understanding is that, during the creation of a Twitter account, the 
language setting is set to a default based on a number of factors including locale and 
machine configuration. This suggests that the accounts that posted the Arabic-language 
tweets were set up by users who are able to understand or use written English. More 
speculatively, it may also suggest that the accounts were either created in a location 
where English is the first language or that the account language was purposefully set to 
English by the user (perhaps either in an attempt to make detection more difficult or 
because the account was created automatically as part of a botnet). 
3.5 Account types 
Table 6 shows the breakdown of extant and suspended original linkers by account type. 
Table 6: Original linkers by account type  
Account type 
Extant original 
linkers 
Suspended original 
linkers 
Total 
Other 82 (5.4%) 869 (57.3%) 951 (62.7%) 
Personal 215 (14.2%) 125 (8.2%) 340 (22.4%) 
Intelligence 
analyst/practitioner 
86 (5.7%) 0 86 (5.7%) 
News/media organisation 60 (4.0%) 18 (1.2%) 78 (5.1%) 
Group 22 (1.5%) 1 (0.1%) 23 (1.5%) 
Academic/researcher 20 (1.3%) 0 20 (1.3%) 
Journalist 14 (0.9%) 5 (0.3%) 19 (1.3%) 
Total 499 (32.9%) 1018 (67.1%) 1517 (100%) 
 
A large proportion of the suspended original linkers fell within the “Other” category 
(869 of 1018: 85.4%). This category included accounts whose purpose could not be 
expressly identified, normally because the account had no profile and/or the username 
was made up of randomised alphanumeric characters. Also contained within this 
account type were suspected bot accounts whose activities appeared to include initial 
dissemination of new issue of the magazine and hashtag-hijacking campaigns designed 
to push the release of a new issue into as many newsfeeds as possible. This is consistent 
with other studies that have shown that IS relies heavily on the use of bots to 
disseminate its content outside of its more insular networks [6], [7]. 
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The next most common account type was personal accounts. A total of 215 extant 
original linkers and 125 suspended original linkers were identified as personal 
accounts. Within the latter, a number of accounts claimed to be IS supporters returning 
to Twitter following the suspension of a previous account. Other research has also noted 
this “ritual” of suspension and return, followed by shout-outs [8]. 
3.6 Tone of posts 
Table 7 shows the breakdown of extant and suspended original linkers by the tone of 
their post. 
Table 7: Original linkers by tone of post  
Account type Extant original linkers Suspended original linkers Total 
Sympathetic 4 (0.3%) 975 (64.3%) 979 (64.5%) 
Critical 245 (16.2%) 21 (1.4%) 266 (17.5%) 
Factual 190 (12.5%) 9 (0.6%) 199 (13.1%) 
Other 60 (4.0%) 13 (0.9%) 73 (4.8%) 
Total 499 (32.9%) 1018 (67.1%) 1517 (100%) 
 
As Table 7 shows, the majority of original linkers (979 of 1517: 64.5%) were 
sympathetic to the message of Rumiyah. Of the 979 sympathetic original linkers, only 
four had not been suspended by the end of our data collection period. This supports the 
findings of previous research that IS sympathiser accounts now experience significant 
disruption on the platform [2]. 
It is also noteworthy that the vast majority of the suspended original linkers (975 of 
1018: 95.8%) were found to be sympathetic to the message of Rumiyah. In respect of 
the other 43 suspended original linkers, it should be reiterated that the reason for their 
suspension may not have been their Rumiyah mentioning post; our dataset includes the 
fact of their suspension but not the reason for it. So, as in our pilot study [3], suspension 
activity appears to be limited to those users that express sympathy or support for IS. 
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4 Conclusion 
To return to the two sets of research questions that we identified at the outset, we 
found that most of the suspended original linkers (i.e. user accounts that posted original 
content, including an out-link, and were suspended by the end of our data collection 
period) were sympathetic to the message of Rumiyah. The usernames of these accounts 
were commonly randomised collections of letters and numbers, the out-links they 
shared were generally to content-sharing websites (presumably containing e-copies of 
the magazine or excerpts from it), and whilst most posted in the English language there 
was also a significant proportion that tweeted in Arabic. Importantly, as in our pilot 
study, these accounts caused only a small splash: they were normally young accounts 
(often less than one day old), with very few followers (or none at all) and received few 
retweets. They thus appeared to be throwaway accounts, that sought to compensate for 
their lack of visibility by repeat posting. 
The other sub-group that we have examined, extant original linkers (i.e. user accounts 
that posted original content, including an out-link, that were still extant at the end of our 
data collection period), had quite a different overall profile. They mostly posted in the 
English language and tended to be the accounts of private individuals, intelligence 
analysts or practitioners, or news/media organisations. They were generally older 
accounts, with higher numbers of followers, and were less likely to engage in repeat 
posting. Their tweets were generally either factual in tone or critical of IS, and they out-
linked to a more diverse range of sources, including news reports, commentary and 
analysis, and activist sites and blogs.  
Perhaps most significant, however, is the fact that the suspended original linkers 
outnumbered the extant original linkers by more than two-to-one. This takes us back to 
our initial objective, to examine whether the findings of our pilot study of Dabiq issue 15 
hold true for a larger dataset. As will be clear by now, there were some significant 
differences between the findings of our pilot study and the findings we have presented 
here. For a start, more distinct user accounts tweeted about issue 15 of Dabiq than all 
nine of the issues of Rumiyah we studied combined. On top of this, whereas in this study 
71.4% of original linkers went on to be suspended by the end of our data collection 
period, in our pilot study 84.5% of original linkers remained extant at the end of the 
data collection period. Together, these findings suggest not merely that more users 
tweeted about Dabiq issue 15, but that this greater level of interest was fuelled by non-
IS sympathisers. In other words, the nine issues of Rumiyah that we studied failed to 
capture the same level of attention from non-IS sympathisers as Dabiq issue 15. Various 
explanations might be offered for this. Perhaps it was due to IS’s territorial losses. 
Perhaps it was because there was greater brand awareness of Dabiq than Rumiyah. Or 
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perhaps it was because issue 15 of Dabiq was particularly successful in targeting a 
particular sub-audience and provoking a response from them. Whilst we can only 
speculate as to the relative causal role of these different explanations, we conclude by 
suggesting that further research that investigates the identifying features of terrorist 
propaganda that is particularly successful in provoking a response from the audiences it 
targets would make a valuable contribution to efforts to disrupt the spread of such 
propaganda and promote alternative narratives. 
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